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Organize for Climate Policies
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*NORCE Social Science, Affiliate Researcher, Centre for Climate and Energy Transformation, University of 
Bergen, Bergen, Norway, **Department of Social and Behavioural Studies, University West, Trollhättan, Sweden
ABSTRACT Through the lenses of “wicked policy problems” this article compares how Norway 
and Sweden organize for climate policies and analyzes the coordination challenges encountered by 
the two countries. Both countries’ policy fields display characteristics of complexity, divergence, 
fragmentation and uncertainty, indicating a substantial degree of organizational wickedness. The 
conditions for dealing with such wickedness is affected by contextual factors such as ministerial 
rule and the petroleum industry’s pivotal role in Norway, enhancing the role of administrative 
silos; and Swedish traditions to delegate responsibility in the governance system and prohibition of 
ministerial rule allows a slightly more unified approach to policies.
Keywords: wicked problems; coordination challenges; public administration; climate policy; 
comparative governance; qualitative methods
1. Introduction
Climate change may be the ultimate wicked problem (Pollitt 2015, 2016). Arguably, such 
problems entail increased, improved and more elaborate approaches to coordination of the 
involved governmental organizations (Lægreid et al. 2014, 2015). In climate governance, 
a polycentric turn has added layers to the formal levels of the policy field (Jordan et al. 2015). 
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Hence, climate policy has become a global issue deeply situated in governance frameworks 
such as the UN and the EU, although enormous responsibilities remain at the national level 
(Zannakis 2015), and a substantial amount of policy challenges are mainly local and regional 
(Neby 2019). Climate change governance thus permeates the entirety of governance systems, 
requiring substantial coordination efforts. Public sector organizations are thus particularly 
important parts of “the tools of government” (Hood 1983). This highlights the role of 
administrative policies and the need for exploring climate policy from a public administration 
perspective (Rykkja et al. 2014; Pollitt 2015, 2016).
The mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and adaptation to climate change impacts 
reflect two separate fields in both the academic literature on climate policies and in actual 
policies, despite calls from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and 
others to see the two as integrated. This article treats the political-administrative orga-
nization of mitigation and adaptation as interconnected phenomena, as cross-sectoral, 
multilevel issues relevant for national policies and for transformation to more sustainable 
societies (Groven et al. 2012; O’Brien et al. 2013). In comparative terms, Norway and 
Sweden have well-developed climate policies and political-administrative structures. An 
important topic is whether mature administrative policies, understood as part of climate 
policy design and instrumentation, reflect the demands posed by climate change as 
a policy challenge: an instrumental premise for the choice of policy tools is that they 
contribute to creating the desired effects (Linder and Peters 1984; Howlett 2018).
That leads us to inquire into the relationship between the wicked character of climate 
policies and governance capacity in the two countries’ systems. Governance capacity refers 
to the objective of making policies effective; governments’ ability to “make things happen” 
(Christensen et al. 2016). This article seeks to provide a better understanding of the 
coordination challenges raised by climate change, contributing to our baseline knowledge 
of the difficulties involved in designing effective climate policies. This requires a two-step 
inquiry, where the first step is empirical and the second more analytical:
a. How do Norway and Sweden organize for climate policies, across the mitigation and 
adaptation divide?
b. From a wicked problems perspective, what are the coordination challenges encoun-
tered by the two countries?
The present study focuses on the systems level: the structures of government, the inter-
connections between public organizations, distributions of roles between central, regional 
and local levels. The article continues as follows: in the second section, we presents our take 
on the issues of wicked problems, coordination challenges, and governance capacity in order 
to provide an analytical framework for the paper. Next, we account for the methods and data 
underpinning the study, before presenting a necessary contextual background on the two 
countries and the climate policies. In the fifth section, we presents our findings in terms of 
four elements of wickedness (complexity, divergence, fragmentation, and uncertainty). The 
final sections provide a discussion of the findings and a set of concluding remarks.
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2. Wickedness, Coordination, and Governance Capacity
Wicked problems (Rittel and Webber 1973) are high on the research agenda. These problems 
include difficulties in delineating policy efforts and proposing solutions, and high degrees of 
complexity and interdependency (Turnpenny et al. 2009). They contain uncertainties and 
inconsistencies regarding needs, preferences, values and consequences of actions, and lead 
to fragmented and heterogeneous actor participation (Carley and Christie 2000; Head 2008; 
Balint et al. 2011; Head and Alford 2015). Thus, solutions do not spell “more science”; instead, 
the challenges emanate from competing value frameworks (cf. Rein and Schon 1996; Daviter 
2019). Such characteristics are indeed relevant for climate policies (Pollitt 2015, 2016).
Managing wicked problems demands governance capacity. The literature displays a certain 
variation in how it assesses governance capacity: By example, Fukuyama (2013) highlights the 
instrumental capacities embedded in a state’s infrastructure, whereas Rothstein and Teorell 
(2008) focus on the quality of government. Evans and Rauch (1999) use the Weberian 
bureaucracy as an indicator, and others focus on the rule of law and regulations (Kleinfeld 
2006). Lodge and Wegrich (2014) take a different approach: Capacity could relate to various 
aspects such as regulation capacity, i.e., control, surveillance, auditing; analytical capacity, i.e., 
processing information, providing advice, etc.; or delivery capacity, i.e., exercising power and 
providing public services (Lodge and Wegrich 2014; Christensen et al. 2016). Without 
neglecting the importance of those types of capacities, in this article we follows a focal point 
in public administration in recent years, coordination capacity.
Coordination capacity refers to the ability to bring different bodies together and align their 
efforts to achieve ends that extend beyond those of single actors in the system (Wegrich and 
Štimac 2014; Neby 2019). This can involve both procedural and structural components, 
typically giving rise to secondary processes and structures that cut across the main organiza-
tional distinctions between the governance system’s constituent parts. Thus, coordination seems 
crucial for managing especially wicked policy problems that cut across many societal and 
administrative levels and organizations. Coordination efforts can follow a hierarchical dimen-
sion, or they can be horizontal between ministries, agencies, or authorities. Moreover, they can 
concern internal affairs within public administration, or external relations, i.e., coordination 
activities between public administration and external organizations (Verhoest and Bouckaert 
2005; Christensen and Lægreid 2008; Pelkonen et al. 2008). In this article, we primarily focuses 
on internal vertical and internal horizontal coordination: the practices within and between 
entities of public administration.
Another perception of coordination is that striving to achieve it is the organizational 
equivalent to “the quest for the philosopher’s stone” (Seidman 1970), indicating coordination 
is both an activity and a virtue. Peters (1998) instead refers to coordination as an achievement or 
an end-state where the programs of government exhibit minimal redundancy, incoherency, and 
lacunae. Our contention is that coordination is a dynamic organizational feature that balances 
the structural and functional components of government. The premise is that coordination is 
attempted, enacted and achieved through means that display different governance rationales: 
coordination is as much about hierarchic arrangements as it is about partnerships or networks, 
sectorial silos, polycentric arrangements, and about finding ways to manage wickedness.
The interpretative scheme for the present study builds on previous refinements of the 
wicked problems literature (Head 2008, 2014; Turnpenny et al. 2009; Wegrich and 
Štimac 2014; Head and Alford 2015) that, in combination, highlight four issues: com-
plexity, divergence, fragmentation and uncertainty. Hence, we understand complexity as 
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(a) the interdependencies between organizational actors in systemic arrangements (for 
example, accountability relations), (b) the number and type of actors, but also (c) the 
extent and scope of different organizational principles involved in a policy field.
Divergence is likely to include (a) distending mandates across levels and sectors, 
understood as conflicting aims, tasks and roles. This could extend to include (b) 
conflicting governance rationales in different parts of the public apparatus (for example, 
across central, regional and local democratic levels, or across policy sub-areas such as 
petroleum and climate policies). This could in turn indicate (c) tensions and conflicts 
between different parts of the administrative system.
Fragmentation relates to (a) problematic subdivisions of policy fields and correspond-
ing organizations, affecting the relative coherence of organizational structures and con-
nections. Fragmentation also relates to (b) variation in organizational types that deal with 
the same thematic issues (for example, across governance levels or sectors). That 
suggests that we also (c) need to understand how responsibility and accountability is 
likely to distribute across organizational forms and affinities.
Finally, we contend that uncertainty relates to insecurities about (a) the effects of 
organizing policy responsibilities in different manners, for instance deciding between dif-
ferent options about governance level or organizational form. This also relates to (b) the 
variation in demands placed on organizations and policies as decision-makers mediate or 
interfere with each other across levels. Across these governance levels, the role of (c) 
exogenous contingencies – understood as influences outside their control – may also vary.
An important part of this interpretative scheme is its ambiguity. Although complexity 
serves as a basic component of political-administrative wickedness, the delineations and 
connections between complexity and the other three dimensions, in analytical terms, are 
vague and open for interpretation. Differently, Noordegraaf et al. (2019) show how ambi-
guity is not only an analytical challenge, it also embeds in the situations that administrative 
actors find themselves in. More precisely, different actors find ways of coping and navigating 
wickedness that signals a certain dissonance between the scholarly meta-discussions of 
wicked problems and the more practical actions chosen within the ambiguous reality of 
creating governance capacity. An important aspect of ambiguity is the role of expectations 
and norms: in ambiguous settings, instrumental considerations tend to be downplayed and 
the role of appropriateness is elevated (March and Olsen 1989).
3. Context and Expectations: Climate Policies and Political Organization
In January 2018, both countries introduced new climate legislation. The two Climate Acts are 
remarkably similar as they state substantial goals for climate policies, carbon budgeting and 
accounting, revision of policies, and establishes new institutional frameworks to ensure policy 
implementation. The acts intervene with a tradition for a relatively incremental development of 
the policy field in both countries. Based on the assertion that climate issues cut across sector 
and level boundaries, the acts may influence the menu of alternatives for both substantial 
policies and the organization of the system needed to implement them. Moreover, the potential 
role of legislation as a coordinative measure may prove to be important, not least concerning 
the relatively “dispersed” nature of the climate policy fields in Norway and Sweden.
Norway’s and Sweden’s geographies and climates differ, as do their adaptation policies. 
Topography, coastline, habitation patterns and climatic impacts indicate different climate 
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adaptation challenges. Seasonal patterns vary, as do precipitation and flood patterns, tempera-
ture fluctuations and expected changes for the future. In both countries, adaptation has been the 
“lesser brother” of climate policies, gaining less attention at the national level and highlighting 
decentralized policy responsibilities. The recent Norwegian climate act briefly points to 
adaptation, while the Swedish government instead presented a climate adaptation strategy in 
parallel with the climate act. Both countries take part in international mitigation initiatives and 
have ambitious aims catering to international agreements. Sweden, however, has a track record 
of emissions reductions that is significantly better than that of Norway (Muntean et al. 2018).
Norway and Sweden belong to the same political-administrative tradition (Painter and 
Peters 2010). Both countries are Scandinavian unitary states with developed economies, 
part of the global north, and with (comparatively speaking) large resources to support 
environmental policies. The countries are highly organized and regulated, with public 
sector engagement that enjoys legitimacy and support, emphasizing “… the capacities of 
collectivities to administer themselves” (Arellano-Gault and Del Castillo-Vega 2004, 
p. 522). This reflects a belief in consensus, collectivist arrangements and organization. 
In both countries, internal horizontal coordination and vertical coordination is common, 
but the instructional nature of the latter is less characteristic than in many other countries 
(Ahlbäck Öberg and Wockelberg 2016).
Swedish and Norwegian municipalities are quite autonomous; local democracy is 
a constitutional pillar. Many climate measures depend on decision-making at this level, 
not least through societal planning that includes mitigation actions and assessments of 
natural hazards. Both countries are currently revising their planning regulations, imply-
ing a potential influence on the municipalities’ efforts. Moreover, both countries employ 
the combination of a regional democratic level and a regional state level: in Norway, 
a recent reform established larger regions, where the geographical boundaries of the 
regional democratic level and the regional state representative corresponds. Traditionally, 
the regional democracy has been labelled country councils (Norwegian: fylke), and the 
regional state has been labelled county governors (Norwegian: Fylkesmann) – we employ 
these terms. We use the same terms for the regional levels in Sweden: county councils for 
the regional democratic level (Swedish region, previously landsting) and county gover-
nors for the Swedish term länsstyrelse. In addition, however, several state agencies have 
regional entities that cut across the boundaries of regions. Norway has a particularly 
intricate and complex geographical organization of state agencies, lacking a national 
standard for geographical distributions.
Importantly, the Norwegian system builds on a principle of ministerial rule. 
A Norwegian minister is responsible for everything that happens within 
their hierarchically defined jurisdiction, sector or silo. The minister is thus accountable 
to parliament without jeopardizing the entire government’s parliamentary position. In 
contrast, Sweden has a system of administrative dualism, resulting in smaller ministries 
and larger semi-autonomous state agencies. Sweden prohibits ministerial rule, meaning 
the government is collectively subject to parliamentary accountability, also when the 
issue at hand resides specifically within a single sector. This institutional setting requires 
a high degree of coordination (Niklasson 2012; Hall 2015). Recent calls for increasing 
the state’s coordinative capacity for managing wicked policy problems is to some extent 
challenged by the historical legacy of ideas of agency autonomy in the Nordic countries, 
perhaps more so in Sweden than in Norway (Hansen et al. 2012). The differences in 
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political-administrative organization between the two countries are often taken to repre-
sent a divide between an eastern and a western Nordic model, with an emphasis on the 
different logics underpinning ministerial accountability and agency autonomy (Knudsen 
and Rothstein 1994; Lægreid 2017).
The combination of country-specific political-administrative settings and the role of 
different aspects of wickedness leads us to highlight two main expectations relevant for 
the present analysis: Firstly, we expect that characteristics of wickedness in the two 
systems are likely to vary with political-administrative traditions. In effect, the Swedish 
dualism and the Norwegian system for ministerial rule is likely to influence how 
complexity, fragmentation, divergence and uncertainty manifests, as they provide slightly 
different frameworks for policy instrumentation.
Secondly, and consequently, we expect that the combination of political-administrative 
traditions and the wickedness characteristics is likely to inform the character of coordi-
nation challenges in the two systems. More precisely, coordination challenges are likely 
to reflect organizational variations and specifics of the policy area in each country. This 
relates to challenges of contestation, multi-level arrangements, and to distributions of 
tasks, roles and power (e.g. accountabilities, mandates, policy areas).
4. Methods and Data
This study primarily draws on written sources about the organization of climate change- 
related organizations in the Norwegian and Swedish political-administrative systems. As 
part of a larger research project, we mapped and described the policy area in both 
countries based on public documents and databases, website information and secondary 
literature. The mapping utilized a template developed for the purpose, distinguishing 
between different types of public organizations (including level of governance, tasks and 
jurisdiction, subdivisions, listing of relevant policy documents and literature, affinities, 
regulatory position, and so on). This allowed qualitative descriptions and assessments of 
each entity. The mapping followed a semi-structured guideline outlining themes of 
relevance. For this article, we focused on extracting information about the organizational 
landscape of climate policies, where the inclusion criterion defines the field: all included 
organizations have explicit and specific policy responsibilities concerning climate 
change: their formal climate responsibilities go beyond the requirements for “policy 
takers”. Accordingly, we exclude organizations that are merely subject to climate 
policies.
In terms of empirical detail, we mainly focus on ministries and agencies, and a general 
description of responsibilities placed with lower level governance actors. We have opted 
to include the latter in our analyses, but the number of actors on this level restricts the 
descriptive detail.
We also draw on interviews and other conversational data gathered from public 
organizations at different governance levels. These interviews were not conducted with 
this specific article in mind but rather to meet the research project’s coverage of 
coordination issues. Highly valuable, they provided insights into coordination activities, 
including details on tensions between different actors or interests, which would otherwise 
be difficult to gain. Within the project Coordination, Capacity and Legitimacy: 
Organizing for Climate Change, Immigration and the Police, altogether ten interviews 
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were conducted with informants from climate-specific actors in the central administra-
tion – two from Sweden and eight in Norway. We also draw on previous projects, 
however, particularly concerning the regional and local levels of climate governance.
Table 1 displays the selection of organizations and levels of governance.
5. Organizing for Climate Policies in Norway and Sweden
There is a trade-off involved in balancing descriptions of the organizational fields in 
detail or aggregating the empirical aspects to a more general description. Our choice is 
the aggregate version, turning to empirical examples for illustrative purposes as an 
integral part of the analysis. The description is oriented towards the four tiers of 
wickedness: complexity, divergence, fragmentation and uncertainty.
5.1 Organizational Complexity
In Norway, the Ministry of Climate and the Environment has holistic responsibilities for 
climate policies. Only counting ministries and agencies that have explicit responsibilities for 
climate policies, there is a minimum of seven climate-related hierarchical silos. For each 
ministry, there is at least one corresponding agency. Four ministries mainly have mitigation 
responsibilities; two have adaptation responsibilities, in addition to the overall responsibil-
ities of the Ministry of Climate and the Environment. There are thus 15 national-level 
government organizations with direct involvement in Norwegian climate policies, excluding 
actors such as the Norwegian Meteorological Institute, or ministries and agencies responsible 
for providing input to climate policies through adjacent jurisdictions. The structure of 
ministries in Norway depends on the executive’s choices: the ministers’ portfolios define 
the detailed policy areas for the ministries. Thus, their names, the number of ministries and 
their responsibilities change over time, although some ministerial silos remain stable, in 
particular finance, judicial matters, foreign policies and defense. As of July 2020, there are 16 
ministries in addition to the prime minister’s office – but as some ministries have two 
ministers, there are 20 ministers, including the prime minister.
In Sweden, the Ministry of the Environment has overall responsibility for climate 
policies, including coordination. The ministry changed name for the seventh time (since 
its inauguration as the Ministry of the Environment and Energy in 1987) in 2019, moving 
energy issues to the Ministry of Infrastructure, established in April 2019, who also took 
over responsibility for transportation issues from the Ministry of Enterprise and 
Innovation. Sweden has fewer ministries than Norway with explicit climate responsibil-
ities (we count five; including the newly established Ministry of Infrastructure). A higher 
number of agencies is involved (our count is twelve, of which six mainly have mitigation 
responsibilities, two mainly have adaptation responsibilities, and four for both). 
Regardless of the prohibition of ministerial rule, state agencies sort under and are 
governed by certain ministries. Thus, the notion of trust-based governance is central to 
the Government Offices (Regeringskansliet). Agencies have relatively free missions and 
the government trusts that they will do a good and important job (interview with public 
servant at the Ministry of the Environment, March 15, 2018). The Swedish 
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) stands out as a coordinating node among 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































at the Climate Department (earlier, coordination responsibilities were scattered between 
different departments at SEPA). Since August 2018, the National Board of Housing, 
Building and Planning and the Swedish National Expert Council for Climate Adaptation, 
tied to the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute, have become key actors in 
the national coordination of climate adaptation. Earlier, the regions, although responsible 
for climate adaptation, lacked appropriate knowledge and interpreted risks differently 
(SOU 2017: p. 42).
In both countries, most agencies also answer for tasks resting outside climate policies. 
Thus, there is a degree of “compartmentalization” (Knutsson et al. 2017), where internal 
specialization and decentralization contributes to complexity. Even within the hierarch-
ical constraints of governmental silos, there are internal organizational prioritizations that 
influence the role of climate-specific sub-entities (for example, in competing for funds, 
competence, agendas and attention).
In conclusion, both countries display a high degree of complexity at the central level. 
Climate policies embed in more specific jurisdictional categories and instruments, for 
example planning regulations, civil protection legislations, transport regulations and so 
on. National policies cut across ministerial silos, and the relationship between ministries 
and agencies is not straightforward. In particular, the number of agencies in relation to 
the number of ministries in Sweden is asymmetric. Arguably, since ministerial rule is 
prohibited, the need to maintain strict hierarchic delineations of governance chains is 
perhaps less important than in Norway, where a higher number of ministries (and a lower 
number of agencies per ministry) reflects the principle of ministerial rule. Norwegian 
agency autonomy depends on the political, hierarchic delineations, whereas Sweden 
seems to allow more autonomy, perhaps also in resolving horizontal organizational 
arrangements among agencies.
An important part of national policy instrumentation is to exert influence over the 
lower levels of the public apparatus. Lending authority, advice and funding from state 
agencies, regions and municipalities are situated within the larger national policy frame-
works (climate legislation, emissions targets, adaptation priorities). Norwegian and 
Swedish county councils and municipalities are democratically autonomous with inde-
pendent policy responsibilities, however. Local and regional planning 
generates frameworks, within which they decide upon most specific measures, but as 
separate decision-making processes. For instance, county councils plan for and operate 
regional collective transportation, where incorporating climate measures is a part of 
public tenders. An illustrative Norwegian example of such contributions to complexity 
is that the Ministry of Local Government and Modernization administers planning 
regulations necessary for regulating waterways. Waterway regulation concerns both 
climate adaptation and preparedness (for instance, flood management), but these two 
concerns sort under different agencies. The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy 
Directorate, which sort under the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, is the main agency 
for waterway regulation. In matters of preparedness, municipalities primarily deal with 
the Directorate for Civil Protection, sorting under the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security. The coordination between three ministerial silos is thus essential.
In both countries, the state level takes an explicit and active role in mitigation policies, 
whereas adaptation responsibilities are mainly decentralized. Arguably, national adapta-
tion policies – and corresponding polities – have been relatively weak, leaving much for 
602 S. Neby and M. Zannakis
lower levels. The numerous municipalities (356 in Norway, 290 in Sweden as of 
January 1, 2020) have the main responsibilities for adaptation measures, based on the 
assumption that adaptation often has a local character. With this comes a shortage of 
coordination capacity; the Swedish government has recently (Government Bill 2017/ 
18 :163), aside from depicting the National Board of Housing, Building and Planning and 
the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute as national coordinating agencies, 
acknowledged this and put greater legal responsibilities on municipalities. Adaptation 
responsibilities are thus largely delegated to local (Norway) and regional (Sweden) 
levels. However, the Norwegian lead ministry, the Ministry of Climate and the 
Environment, does have adaptation responsibilities (shared with the Ministry of Local 
Government and Modernization and others). This is not the case in Sweden, which lacks 
a lead ministry for adaptation.
The county governors (Norway has 11, Sweden 21) function as a link between national 
policies and local policy implementation, carrying out audits of municipal activities, 
guide and council municipalities in their work, and provide feedback to national actors 
from local authorities. Importantly, the 2020 Norwegian municipal reform recently 
reduced the number of municipalities significantly (from 422 to 356), also reducing the 
number of regional divisions from 19 to 11. The distinction between the regional 
democratic institutions and the regional state representative remains. A similar, decade- 
long debate in Sweden regarding a reduction of (from 21 to suggested 6–9) regions has 
not led to any decisions due to a divided opinion (cf. Wockelberg and Ahlbäck Öberg 
2018).
5.2 Organizational Divergence
In Norway, divergence have not manifested as standoffs at the ministerial level, which 
may be due to an acceptance of the principle of ministerial rule. Ministerial rule allows 
politically distending mandates, partly resolving the otherwise difficult issue of political 
accountability. However, divergence remains latent within the silos, surfacing at the 
subordinate agency levels and in political debate. An example concerns adaptation, 
where municipalities and counties experience mixed signals from agencies. Informants 
maintain that the Directorate of Civil Protection and the Norwegian Water Resources and 
Energy Directorate deal with adaptation challenges in conflicting manners: where the 
former stresses formal procedural demands and a hierarchically oriented regulative 
approach, the latter stresses epistemics, dialogue and a “softer” regulatory style. As 
seen from the two agencies’ point of view, these approaches are complementary: the 
Directorate of Civil Protection primarily stresses preparedness and security issues 
through demands for municipal risk and vulnerability assessments, while the Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate supplies formalized knowledge-based support services 
(such as flood thresholds, waterflow estimates) from a water management perspective. 
For the municipalities, however, these two strings of adaptation issues tend to collide in 
societal planning, as the agencies’ rationales for action and regulatory styles differ in 
policy issues that involve both. Municipalities explicitly raise frustrations that distending 
rationales cause confusion and indecision in planning efforts.
Sweden has a history of inter-ministerial tension in climate policies where the Ministry 
of Finance, the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation, and the Ministry of the 
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Environment have advocated different views (Zannakis 2009). The tension has primarily 
concerned different views on policy measures: the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry 
of Enterprise and Innovation emphasized the importance of efficiency and advocated an 
economic perspective on climate politics, the former in a more neoclassical and – 
according to critics – shortsighted manner. The Ministry of the Environment instead 
promoted a broader (scientific) view, including other values than economic efficiency 
when evaluating climate policy measures. An interviewed public servant at the Ministry 
of the Environment (March 15, 2018) describes a very similar tension within the 
government offices, where some actors advocate a quite narrow theoretical economics 
perspective in contrast to others emphasizing climate science and feasibility of policy 
measures. In this person’s view, the economic perspective, based on rather simple 
economic modelling, has a quite strong hold in the Swedish government administration 
compared to other countries, where such modelling is more developed and nuanced. 
Reports indicate that there are common views on climate-related issues within ministries/ 
agencies, although diverging views stemming from different silos in the governance 
structure do surface. For instance, the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency may 
interpret that the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation or the Swedish Energy Agency 
have other considerations and defend other interests than pure environmental/climate 
interests (Interview, March 19, 2018). Despite the prohibition of ministerial rule and 
relatively strong agencies in Sweden, agencies tend to have views that correspond to 
those of their “home ministry”, allowing tensions between agencies from different 
government silos.
In vertical terms, regional and local actors in both countries have on occasion raised 
criticism towards central ministries; that national policies are too distant and too oriented 
towards a global policy paradigm. There are systemic features that reflect this situation. 
The relative democratic autonomy of regions and municipalities levels may “insulate” 
the national and local levels from each other, somewhat enhanced by the silo-based state- 
level organization. A risk is that silos prevent positive spillover effects or synergies 
between adjacent climate issues, such as using infrastructure for adaptation purposes (for 
example, investing in hydropower to regulate water flow, preventing floods) in situations 
where local decision-makers depend on “competing” central authorities for approval or 
regulation. Many Swedish municipalities claim that state authorities’ support for local 
planning, which they are required to offer according to the Planning and Building Act, is 
too general and not useful.
The somewhat stronger presence of adaptation responsibilities at the central level in 
Norway and the specific Norwegian construction of ministries focused on local issues 
and modernization, and on oil and energy, mirrors the ministerial silos, as well as the 
saliency of both petroleum politics and center–periphery issues. The Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy’s role signals a certain divergence in the system, where 
balancing less climate-friendly (but societally highly important) considerations with 
climate issues such as renewable energy production is an important characteristic. 
Perhaps less visible in Sweden, the relative tension between the Ministry of the 
Environment, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Enterprise and 
Innovation could be taken to indicate some degree of divergence. Further, the 
Swedish Environmental Protection Agency seems to play a stronger role than the 
Norwegian Environment Agency, which reflects one of the differences between the 
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Swedish and Norwegian system in general: In Sweden, the prohibition of ministerial 
rule allows agencies to play a more prominent role in making regulative decisions. In 
Norway, the more direct hierarchical accountability that follows ministerial rule allows 
more ministerial, political leeway. Arguably, this reflects functional premises of the 
governance systems. An administrative apparatus that needs to deal with conflicting 
policies may cause divergence in Norway, whereas divergence in Sweden largely may 
revolve around the functional premises laid down in administrative policies.
5.3 Organizational Fragmentation
Despite ministries with dedicated climate responsibilities – albeit only for mitigation in 
Sweden – there is a certain degree of fragmentation: the policy issue distributes across various 
organizational actors, with different mandates. The complex set of ministerial silos in Norway 
raises issues concerning the organization of responsibilities and accountabilities in vertical and 
horizontal terms. For instance, it is not clear how accountabilities based on thematic distinc-
tions distribute. Climate policies are certainly a matter for the Ministry of Climate and the 
Environment, but what if the issue at hand mainly involves planning regulations directed 
towards the municipalities? In such a case, the Ministry of Local Government and 
Modernization is the parent ministry, but not if the issue crosses over to preparedness or 
societal security, which leads the chain of accountability to the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security. This is a likely scenario for adaptation issues, not least as reported by municipalities. 
However, municipalities and regions are themselves democratically accountable for policy 
development and implementation and cannot simply lean on the central level.
The number of involved agencies reflects the fragmentation displayed at the ministerial 
level; perhaps more so in Sweden, with a larger number of agencies involved. Principal 
agencies are the Norwegian Environment Agency and the Swedish Environmental 
Protection Agency, which sort under the respective country’s main environmental ministry. 
They have broad portfolios of tasks that relate to both environmental and climate issues, 
where a Climate Department is responsible for climate issues, with five/six climate policy- 
relevant units that work with a variety of climate issues, ranging from international 
negotiations to administering the industrial CO2 quota compensation systems.
The adaptation–mitigation divide is another source of organizational fragmentation. 
In some contrast to Norway, Sweden does not have a ministry or agency with the 
overall responsibilities for adaptation policies, although the National Board of 
Housing, Building and Planning and the Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological 
Institute have recently been designated (different) coordinating responsibilities. In 
Norway, the coordinating responsibility for adaptation rests with the Ministry of 
Climate and the Environment, with delegated tasks to the Norwegian Environment 
Agency – and with important responsibilities for regulative measures resting with the 
Ministry of Local Government and Modernization. The Swedish county governors 
have a clearer responsibility for climate adaptation than do their Norwegian counter-
parts. The regional state level is the prime governance level for adaptation in Sweden 
(despite clear calls for national-level coordination), whereas Norwegian county gover-
nors are pivotal in a different way: they function as a hub connecting levels and as 
a regulatory authority.
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We can thus cannot speak of a “climate sector” in organizational terms, but more of 
a fragmented organizational field of public actors that have varying, distributed man-
dates, and that handle their responsibilities through complex internal subdivisions.
5.4 Organizational Uncertainty
The climate literature stresses uncertainty about physical climate change and its impact. 
Although present within public administrations, another type of uncertainty stems from 
how the political-administrative apparatus engages with climate issues. In our interpre-
tative scheme, there are in particular three issues at hand: the question of whether 
measures have the intended effects, the relationship between expectations towards public 
institutions and their ability to meet these, and the role of external contingencies beyond 
the control of political-administrative bodies.
Where Norway has clearly separated energy and climate issues at the ministerial level, 
Sweden has, for several periods over the last three decades, has not. The Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy reflects the political gravity of Norwegian petroleum production. 
This suggests, firstly, that sectorial boundaries connect to the saliency of sectorial 
politics, and, secondly, that political debates about emissions are not straightforward. 
Norwegian mitigation policies in recent years have to some extent focused on emissions 
from oil production (Andersen 2016), which are included in Norwegian emission statis-
tics. However, they downplay emissions caused by petroleum exports, since established 
statistical regimes do not include such emissions. This is an important crossover between 
political discourse and the physical aspects of emissions: annual production-related 
emissions currently amount to approximately, 14 million tons of CO2 emissions (of 
a 50+ million tons in total), whereas the consumption of Norwegian-produced fossils 
abroad amounts to some 650 million tons of CO2 emissions annually. This intricate 
political–statistical balance between climate and petroleum policies in Norway stems 
from generous petroleum revenues, a foundation for stability in public spending on, for 
example, welfare and healthcare. Sweden has not had to deal with this issue, allowing 
a more holistic approach to climate policies. Hence, there are larger uncertainties 
connected to what the Norwegian system can produce in terms of policy effects than 
in Sweden.
Further, Norwegian municipalities’ adaptation efforts must match larger variations in 
adaptation challenges than in Sweden. West Norwegian municipalities have different 
adaptation challenges than those to the east, coastal challenges differ across southern, 
western and northern parts of the country, and so on. Moreover, Norwegian municipa-
lities are typically smaller than the Swedish, and recent reforms at the regional and local 
level generate an organizational uncertainty related to tasks, mandates and role distribu-
tions. Some adaptation measures are costly physical endeavors that municipalities cannot 
handle autonomously. A recent Norwegian example illustrates this: in a western munici-
pality, the cost of a needed flood tunnel is an estimated €150 million Euros – an amount 
of funds this midsized municipality has no chance to raise, lend or advance. Thus, local 
plans, although needed, depend on the priorities of central actors. Such investments and 
measures are thus likely to involve both political and administrative actors on most – if 
not all – levels.
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The question of uncertainty for public administration in Norway and Sweden is less 
about the physical aspect, and more about the societal, organizational and political 
factors that influence priorities. In adaptation matters, municipalities may be restricted 
from making and implementing effective decisions within their domains. In other areas, 
sectorial policies may be conflicting – even in the organizational sense. The Norwegian 
petroleum industry also shows how external contingencies influence climate policy, in 
some contrast to the Swedish allowance of a more holistic approach with less conflicting 
aims to resolve.
6. Discussion
Initially, we posed two questions: Firstly, we asked how Norway and Sweden organize 
for climate policies, across the mitigation and adaptation divide. Secondly, from a more 
analytically oriented wicked problems perspective, we inquired into the coordination 
challenges encountered by the two countries.
The comparisons between Norway and Sweden indicate that the “framing” of the 
problem matters. Swedish policies take a slightly different point of departure than 
Norwegian policies, as their collective orientation allows a somewhat clearer organiza-
tional layout. The Norwegian policy field – allowing ministerial rule – displays a higher 
degree of complexity at the ministerial level. A higher number of municipal actors in 
Norway contributes to this picture, not least, as these have large responsibilities for 
climate adaptation. The Norwegian split between energy and climate policies in terms of 
ministerial organization reflects that context matters: in organizational terms, Norwegian 
energy policies do conflictingly overlap with climate policies, partly in emissions 
discussions, partly in renewables and adaptation policies. It is important to note that 
some climate-specific policy responsibilities sort under policy themes defined as “some-
thing else”. A good example is how climate adaptation effectively depends on the Plan 
and Building Code and the Civil Protection Act for authority and instrumentation. 
A typical response to such challenges in Norway is the establishment of horizontal, semi- 
formalized networks that cut across governance levels and sectors, such as the cross- 
agency and multilevel initiative “Climate Adaptation Norway”, which gathers 17 differ-
ent actors across silos and levels in dealing with adaptation issues. Although prohibited 
from formal decision-making or policymaking, such arrangements ensure dialogue and 
interaction that ideally contribute to aligning the perspectives of different actors – but 
also increase complexity.
Regarding the second research question, we find that coordination challenges are 
both vertical and horizontal, they span across sectors and silos, and across organiza-
tions that differ in terms of size, type, and jurisdiction. In Sweden, one way to deal 
with coordination challenges, and to assure that the government’s intentions are 
followed, is the institutionalized instrument “joint preparation”: when one ministry’s 
concerns overlap with another ministry’s area of responsibility, cases must be prepared/ 
discussed jointly. For instance, when the Ministry of Enterprise and Innovation deals 
with large investments with climate impacts it needs to consult the Ministry of the 
Environment, which is responsible for Sweden’s overall climate policy. This usually 
occurs as inter-ministerial consultations officer to officer, but when trickier issues 
appear, officers need to consult their managers – more rarely, state secretaries or 
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ministers consult. These examples suggest that important vertical coordination takes 
place within everyday routines of horizontal coordination between ministries or 
between intra-ministerial units. It is not always clear, even to involved actors, how 
consensus arises: an informant’s attempt to describe the process is through “construc-
tive ambiguity” (interview with public servant at the Ministry of the Environment, 
March 15, 2018).
Characteristic is that both countries, is a lack of delineations of climate policies as 
coherent, national policy fields. The basic state-level framework is influential; 
Norwegian ministerial rule allows a higher degree of political tension and conflict, 
which causes emphasis on structural solutions that follow silos. Adversely, the 
Swedish prohibition of ministerial rule allows a more collective and unified approach 
at the central level. Generally, where Norwegian policies often display a structural and 
governmental approach, Swedish governance is more characterized by a “continuous 
framing” that allows consensus to form (Neby 2009). When including regional and local 
levels to the mix, however, it is harder to distinguish the two countries.
Returning to the four dimensions of wickedness, divergence between state-level actors 
is easier to spot as agencies interact with municipalities. From interviews and workshops, 
we experience that Norwegian actors across levels are surprisingly unaware of the details 
of regulations and jurisdictions, tasks and roles that each actor must negotiate when 
interacting with others across levels. Structural complexity may thus amplify divergence 
in the practical sense, particularly where more than two actors have legitimate jurisdic-
tional claims. This suggests that divergence depends on a pre-existing complex situation. 
As coordination turns into practice, the properties of wickedness seem to become more 
evident and visible. That may also be an important characteristic of the Norwegian 
situation with ministerial rule: when silos are the main rule, the negotiations that follow 
from cross-sectoral interaction could arise as divergence.
Increased wickedness thus seems to amplify coordination challenges, but in slightly 
different forms in Norway and Sweden. We cannot directly assume that the wickedness 
originating from the climate issue as such is the main driver of coordination challenges, 
as there are additional contextual contingencies that mark the systems. Such factors 
include, but are not limited to, ministerial rule or not, the role of competing concerns and 
interests, geographical and physical challenges, local and regional democracy, or public 
management traditions. Daviter (2019) argues that if we understand wicked problems as 
essentially contested and conflicting, policy choices should dialogue with – rather than 
substitute – relevant controversies, offering a possible remedy for all-too instrumental 
views of evidence and capacity in policy formation and implementation. The two 
systems in our study provides slightly different avenues for such an approach, where 
the Swedish dualism and semi-autonomous agency levels may allow contestation in 
terms of expertise and professional judgment to a higher extent than the Norwegian 
case – where it seems likely that contestation is of a more political nature.
7. Conclusions
Both the Swedish and the Norwegian climate policy fields display characteristics of 
complexity, divergence, fragmentation and uncertainty in organizational terms. Thus, it 
seems safe to conclude that the organization of this field in the two countries display 
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a substantial degree of wickedness. Although quite comparable in terms of their organi-
zational choices, there are variations between the countries that seem to make 
a difference: Norwegian ministerial rule, Swedish traditions for delegation to, compara-
tively speaking, semi-autonomous agencies, the Norwegian petroleum industry, and 
more. Thus, there are slight variations in the coordination challenges the two countries 
face, accompanied by corresponding differences in their approach to coordination. As the 
present study includes both mitigation and adaptation issues, complexity certainly 
increases. This is partly due to the study’s design (including both), but also an often 
-neglected holistic challenge for climate policies.
The wicked problems approach – interpreted as a set of organizational factors – can 
arguably contribute to our understanding of the field. Wickedness certainly amplifies 
coordination challenges. However, a question that requires further research, is how 
secondary arrangements operating across formal jurisdictions function and influence 
policy. Also, there is a degree of ambiguity in both the analytical framework and in 
our empirical observations that are not easily resolved. As the relative wickedness 
increases, we argue, so does the relative ambiguity of challenges. Norway and Sweden 
handle these challenges slightly differently, and choices of policy instrumentation and 
implementation are likely to reflect the institutional compositions and traditions shaping 
each country.
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